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Fiduciary duty is one of the most litigated areas in corporate law,
and the subject of much academic attention, yet one important question
has been ignored. Should fiduciary liability be assessed individually,
where directors are examined one-by-one for compliance, or collectively,
where the board’s compliance as a whole is all that matters? The choice
between individual and collective assessment can be the difference
between a director’s liability and her exoneration, affects how boards
function, and informs the broader fiduciary duty literature in important
ways. This article is the first to explore the individual/collective question
and suggest a systematic way of approaching it. The article is both
descriptive, in examining how some courts have answered this question
(often implicitly), and normative, in asking whether the courts’ tentative
answer makes for good corporate governance policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Efforts to improve corporate governance routinely focus on the
board of directors, who enjoy almost unfettered control over the
corporation.1 Recognizing this “director primacy,”2 policymakers, courts,
and legal scholars constantly look for ways to improve board functioning,
especially in the wake of scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and other
corporations.3 Making directors independent of management is a popular
theme,4 as are calls for subjecting directors to more robust fiduciary
duties. Fiduciary duties are meant to serve as a check on director power
1

See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2006) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors…”).
2

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. L. REV. 547 (2003).
3

Jill E. Fisch, Corporate Governance: Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 265, 265 (1997) (“Today’s corporate world is taking corporate governance and, in
particular, the role of the board of directors, very seriously.”).
4

Director independence is a defining feature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Pub. L. No. 107-204 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.). Also, the NYSE
and NASDAQ now require that listed companies have a majority of independent
directors. For skepticism about the push toward director independence, see Sanjai Bhagat
and Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999) (empirical study suggesting that greater director
independence does not improve corporate performance, and that too many independent
directors may actually hurt corporate performance); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human
Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 800 (suggesting director
independence is not necessarily a good thing and that market and social forces should be
allowed to determine the proper amount of director independence without legal
mandates).
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and to provide a means of reducing agency costs between shareholders
and directors. Currently, however, fiduciary duties are a weak impetus for
directors to act in the best interests of shareholders, at least to the extent
that fiduciary law would seek to impose liability for director wrongdoing.
This recognition has led some corporate law scholars to call for stricter
fiduciary duties, which could take the form of an explicit duty to act in
good faith5 or a revival of the duty of care, which is now on life support.6
Other corporate law scholars (and judging by the recent Disney case,7
Delaware courts) take a more pessimistic view of fiduciary duty law as a
potential cure for what ails boards, preferring to leave corporate
governance to other devices, including market sanctions.8
The fiduciary duty literature is rich and fruitful, which makes it
surprising that one important question within fiduciary law – a question
that bears upon all the others – has been virtually ignored. Directors, of
course, do not operate in isolation; they are only capable of acting by
majority vote. In practice, they usually act unanimously.9 Yet each
5

See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 494
(2004) (arguing in favor of an independent duty of good faith that has the “potential for
addressing those outrageous and egregious abdications of fiduciary behavior that are not
simply the results of bad process or conflicts”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good
Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 27-31 (2006) (providing normative
justifications for an independent duty of good faith).
6

See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 407-08 (2005)
(observing with disfavor that “[o]ver the last twenty years, a variety of mechanisms have
contributed to a virtual elimination of legal liability for directors who breach their duty of
care”); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting
Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105 (2006) (arguing in favor
of due care liability calibrated by an individual director’s ability to pay); Cheryl L. Wade,
Symposium: Enron and Its Aftermath: Corporate Governance Failures and the
Managerial Duty of Care, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 767, 768 (2002) (“greater emphasis on
standards of care for both directors and officers is warranted, especially in the aftermath
of the corporate governance failures that scandalized Enron, WorldCom, and other large
publicly held companies").
7
The Disney case, which spent the last several years bouncing between the
Delaware Chancery and Supreme Courts, involved notably lax behavior on the part of
Disney’s board of directors in the hiring and firing of president Michael Ovitz. Ovitz
received an approximately $140 million severance package for fifteen months work, and
shareholders sued the directors alleging fiduciary duty breaches in connection with the
payout. The directors were ultimately exonerated by both the Delaware Chancery Court
and the Delaware Supreme Court. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,
2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113 (2005); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 2006
Del. LEXIS 307. This case is discussed in Section II.A.3.
8

See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 985, 1027 (1993) (“A particularly questionable academic position…is
that fiduciary duties, structures, and remedies must be imposed by law because market
forces alone cannot eliminate agency costs.”).
9

Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty of
Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1489 (1984) (“Actions [of the board]
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director is an individual, and each will either comply or not comply with
the standards set by fiduciary law. For example, one director may have a
conflict of interest, while the remaining board members do not. Also,
different directors may have exercised different levels of carefulness in
reaching their decisions. Given these differences (or potential differences)
among directors, what impact does one director’s fiduciary duty breach
have on the liability of the remaining directors? Or, flipping the question,
what impact does the compliance of the remaining directors have on the
liability of the one breaching director? More broadly, the unexplored
question within fiduciary duty law is how outcomes are affected when all
directors vote the same way,10 but some directors comply with their
fiduciary duties while others do not. Should director liability be assessed
individually or collectively?
An individual focus does not allow a director to hide behind her
counterparts, but instead deems her singular breach of sufficient gravity to
jeopardize the board’s functioning and warrant legal sanctions. A
collective focus, on the other hand, will serve to insulate any one
director’s wrongdoing provided the remaining directors complied with
their fiduciary duties.11
Therefore, how courts answer the
are usually by consensus. If a significant sentiment of disagreement is sensed by the
chairman, the matter is usually put over for later action, and sources of compromise and
persuasion are pursued in the interim.”); James D. Cox and Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in
the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate
Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 91 (1985) (a “new board member is expected
not only to work within the group’s collective views of the corporate interest, but also to
cooperate with other board members in reaching decisions by group consensus”).
10

Directors who vote against a particular course of action should be immune from
liability. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826 (NJ 1981) (“Usually a
director can absolve himself from liability by informing the other directors of the
impropriety and voting for a proper course of action.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 145
(2004):
Any director who may have been absent when [an unlawful dividend or
stock repurchase] was done, or who may have dissented from the act or
resolution by which the same was done, may be exonerated from such
liability by causing his or her dissent to be entered on the books
containing the minutes of the proceedings of the directors at the time
the same was done, or immediately after such director has notice of the
same.
The absentee director presents a more difficult case. Courts have held absentee
directors liable for board decisions, although this is sometimes in the banking context
where fiduciary duties are heightened. See FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1433 (1993)
(“The fact that an absentee director had no knowledge of the transaction and did not
participate in it does not absolve him of liability.”); Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893 (10th
Cir. 1986) (holding a semi-retired bank director liable for breaching his duty of care
because he did not take affirmative steps to become informed about the actions of another
director). For an example outside of the banking context, see the discussion of absenteedirector O’Boyle’s liability in Smith v. Van Gorkom, infra note 25.
11

See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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individual/collective question has important practical ramifications.
Although the choice between treating directors individually or collectively
is only one of the variables in fiduciary duty suits, it has the potential to be
the difference between a director’s liability and her exoneration. As a
result, it carries significant financial implications for directors,
shareholders, insurers, and attorneys. Moreover, how courts answer the
individual/collective question can affect how directors interact with one
another, and can provide important insights into the judicial view of
fiduciary duties as a corporate governance mechanism.
This article favors a duty-based answer to the individual/collective
question on both descriptive and normative grounds. First, it will show
that courts have generally focused on the board as a whole in duty of care
cases, and on directors as individuals in duty of loyalty cases. Second, the
article will argue that courts have been correct in drawing this duty-based
distinction because it strikes the proper balance between the board’s
authority and its accountability in each case.12 It contends that loyalty
breaches, if committed by even a single director, are likely to impact the
board’s functioning in a meaningfully way, and therefore those breaches
warrant greater accountability though an individual director focus. On the
other hand, due care breaches committed by only one director are unlikely
to jeopardize the board’s functioning in the same way, and therefore these
breaches call for more deferential collective focus. Because good faith
now appears to be a subset of the duty of loyalty,13 and because it too
involves intentional wrongdoing,14 allegations of bad faith also warrant an
individual director focus. Of course, corporate law cases do not always
confine themselves to such tidy classifications, and this article should be
read as proposing a general framework for analysis rather than hard-andfast rules to cover every situation.
After contending that courts are properly oscillating between a
collective and individual focus to director liability depending on the type
of fiduciary duty at issue, this article asks what broader lessons we might
take away from this. It suggests that this duty-based distinction reveals a
further splintering between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty and a
deemphasis on fiduciary duty liability as a corporate governance
mechanism. On the other hand, that courts have only implicitly adopted
the laxer collective approach in due care cases suggests that the duty of
care is still important as an aspirational “standard of conduct,” if not a
“standard of liability.”
This article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the existing law on
the collective versus individual treatment of directors in fiduciary duty
12

See infra Part III.A.1.

13

After the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stone v. Ritter, 2006 WL
3169168, it appears settled that the duty to act in good faith is a subset of the duty of
loyalty rather than an independent fiduciary duty. See infra Part III.B.1.b.
14

See infra Part III.B.1.
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suits. This law is comprised of cases that explicitly address the question,
cases that implicitly address it, and statutes from Delaware and the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA). Existing law reveals a preference for
an individual director focus in duty of loyalty cases, and a preference for a
collective focus in duty of care cases. Part III first sets forth the normative
criteria that should inform the choice between the two assessment
approaches on corporate governance policy grounds, and then applies
those criteria to the different types of fiduciary duty claims that may be
brought. It concludes that courts are creating good corporate governance
policy through their duty-based distinction. Part IV draws broader
implications about fiduciary duties from the courts’ resolution of the
individual/collective question. Part V concludes.
II
THE INDIVIDUAL/COLLECTIVE QUESTION: EXISTING LAW
Existing law on the individual/collective question is difficult to
decipher. Forming any sort of a coherent picture about how the law views
this question requires piecing together case law that explicitly addresses
the question, case law that implicitly addresses it, and relevant statutory
provisions from Delaware and the MBCA. Engaging in this exercise
reveals an individual/collective focus that shifts depending on the type of
fiduciary breach being litigated. Duty of loyalty claims tend to be
analyzed using an individual approach, while duty of care claims tend to
be analyzed using a collective approach.15
This section begins by examining three high-profile Delaware cases
that have explicitly addressed the individual/collective question, albeit
briefly and inadequately. It then touches on case law that could be said to
implicitly answer the question. Finally, it introduces a Delaware statute
and provision from the MBCA that speak to this question. While other
statutes may also be relevant, the two provisions chosen for illustration are
important provisions that provide support for the duty-based framework
that emerges from the case law.
A. Cases Explicitly Addressing the Individual/Collective Question
1. Smith v. Van Gorkom
The first of the three Delaware cases to explicitly address the
collective versus individual treatment of directors in fiduciary duty suits

15

Roberta Romano makes this observation in discussing board stability. Roberta
Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J.
1155, 1178 n. 39 (1990) (“A duty of care violation is likely to involve the entire board,
whereas a duty of loyalty violation tends to be limited to directors (typically insiders)
who have personally benefited from a transaction.”).
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was the famous case of Smith v. Van Gorkom.16 In that case, decided in
1985, the Delaware Supreme Court took the unprecedented step of holding
all ten directors of Trans Union Corporation jointly and severally liable for
$23.5 million for breaching their duty of care in approving the sale of the
corporation.17 Trans Union’s Chairman and CEO, Jerome Van Gorkom,
orchestrated the sale with the help of another inside director, Bruce
Chelberg. The remainder of the board was not informed of the proposal
until the day before the buyer’s deadline for accepting it.18 The board
approved the sale based on a twenty-minute presentation by Van Gorkom,
supported by Chelberg, as well as the advice of Trans Union’s legal
counsel and the directors’ “knowledge of the market history of the
Company’s stock.”19
When Trans Union shareholders brought a class action suit against
the directors, the directors elected to present a unified defense. The court
held that “since all of the defendant directors, outside as well as inside,
take a unified position, we are required to treat all of the directors as one
as to whether they are entitled to the protection of the business judgment
rule.”20 Pursuant to this collective approach, the court did not distinguish
between Van Gorkom’s orchestration of the transaction without the
board’s knowledge, Chelberg’s complicity, and the board’s failure to
become adequately informed or to sufficiently deliberate once it learned of
the proposal. Instead, because the directors presented a uniform defense
for their actions, the court held that they should be treated as a unit for
assessing liability.
In this particular case, the collective approach was adopted at the
directors’ request. Justice Moore, at least, appeared skeptical that a
collective focus was appropriate. During the appeal, the Delaware
Supreme Court requested a special hearing to determine whether there
were “factual or legal reasons” to treat the directors differently.21 In the
hearing, Justice Moore and directors’ common counsel engaged in the
following colloquy:
“JUSTICE MOORE: Is there a distinction between
Chelberg and Van Gorkom vis-à-vis the other defendants?
COUNSEL: No, sir.
16

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).

17

It was reported, however, that the directors paid very little of this amount: their
D&O insurance paid $10 million, the policy limit, and the acquiror, Jay Pritzker, paid
nearly all of the $13.5 million balance. See Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical
Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (1985).
18

488 A.2d at 868.

19

Id. at 869.

20

Id. at 889.

21

Id. at 899.
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JUSTICE MOORE: None whatsoever?
COUNSEL: I think not.”22
According to Charles O’Kelley and Robert Thompson, the court was
“trying to drive a wedge between directors who were negligent or disloyal
and those who were not.”23 The directors, however, chose the collective
strategy in the hopes that the court would be unwilling to find the outside
directors liable, thereby also shielding the more culpable insiders. The
Van Gorkom court did honor the directors’ request for collective
treatment, but instead of exonerating the directors, it “exploded a bomb”24
by splitting 3-2 in favor of liability for the whole board – including a
director who was ill and had not been present at the meeting where the
sale was approved.25 Justice Moore, one of the three judges voting in
favor of liability, later stated that “the strategic maneuver to cast down the
gauntlet before the Delaware Supreme Court hardly appears to have been
among the wisest decisions in the annals of corporate America.”26
22

Id.

23

CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY AND ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (4TH ed. 2003), TEACHER’S MANUAL at 111. See also
Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium: Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.s,
Corporate Law Rules, and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96 NW
U. L. REV. 607, 609-619 (2002) (arguing that in Van Gorkom, the whole board was
punished for Jerome Van Gorkom’s misconduct). Cf. Elliott J. Weiss, What Lawyers Do
When the Emperor Has No Clothes: Evaluating CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America and its Progency—Part I, 78 GEO. L. J. 1655, 1658 n. 18 (“In my view, the Van
Gorkom court was concerned primarily with the manner in which Van
Gorkom…presented the proposed transaction to the board, and with the outside directors’
refusal to dissociate themselves from Van Gorkom when they learned that he had
provided them with incomplete information.”).
24

Manning, supra note 17, at 1.

25

Upon release of the court’s judgment of liability, this outside director, Thomas
O’Boyle, was granted leave for a change of counsel. In his motion for reargument,
O’Boyle claimed “standing to take a position different from that of his fellow directors
and that legal grounds exist for finding him not liable for the acts or omissions of his
fellow directors.” 488 A.2d at 898. The court unanimously ruled that this argument had
been waived, noting that during trial “a special opportunity was afforded the individual
defendants, including O’Boyle, to present any factual or legal reasons why each or any of
them should be individually treated.” Id. at 899.
26

Andrew G.T. Moore II, The 1980s—Did We Save the Stockholders While the
Corporation Burned?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 277, 281-82 (1992):
This [collective] position was taken even though it was obvious that
certain directors were more culpable than others, and in the face of the
Court’s invitation that they take separate positions with a clear hint of
exoneration for all but the most culpable insiders….In a way, they were
‘daring’ us to find them all liable to save certain insiders. In light of
our decision finding all the directors liable, the strategic maneuver to
cast down the gauntlet before the Delaware Supreme Court hardly
appears to have been among the wisest decisions in the annals of
corporate America.
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2. In re Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation
After Van Gorkom, the Delaware courts did not explicitly revisit the
individual/collective question until 2004, in the case of In re: Emerging
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.27 This class action suit
alleged that the directors of Emerging Communications, Inc. breached
their fiduciary duties in approving a “going private” acquisition of the
company by its Chairman and CEO, Jeffrey Prosser.28 The transaction
was originally proposed to be a merger of another corporation owned by
Prosser into Emerging Communications. Prosser, however, “flipped” the
transaction to a privatization in which his other corporation would acquire
Emerging Communications due to his belief that the market had
undervalued Emerging Communications, making it available for purchase
at a discounted price.29
The Emerging Communications board was comprised of seven
directors, including inside director Prosser, inside director and company
counsel John Raynor, and outside director and financial expert Salvatore
Muoio. Justice Jacobs of the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting by
designation on the Chancery Court, found these three directors, but none
others, jointly and severally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties of
loyalty “and/or” good faith in approving the privatization at $10.25 per
share given the judicially determined fair value of $38.05 per share.30
In his opinion, without citing Van Gorkom, Justice Jacobs held that
“[t]he liability of the directors must be determined on an individual basis
because the nature of their breach of duty (if any), and whether they are
exculpated from liability for that breach, can vary for each director.”31
Applying this individual approach, Justice Jacobs imposed liability on
Prosser for violating his duty of loyalty for self-dealing;32 Raynor for
breaching his duty of loyalty “and/or” good faith for assisting Prosser in
the privatization and for “consciously disregarding his duty to the minority
27

2004 WL 1305745.

28

The privatization occurred in two steps. First, Innovative Communications
Corporation, L.L.C., which was effectively wholly owned by Prosser and was already the
majority stockholder of Emerging Communications, acquired 29% of Emerging
Communications’ outstanding shares in a first-step tender offer. Two months later,
Innovative acquired the balance of the outstanding shares in a second-step cash-out
merger of Emerging Communications into an Innovative subsidiary. Id. at *1.
29

Id. at *5.

30

Id. at *11.

31

Id. at *38.

32

Prosser also breached his duty of loyalty as a majority stockholder of Emerging
Communications “by eliminating [the company’s] minority stockholders for an unfair
price in an unfair transaction that afforded the minority no procedural protections.” Id. at
*38.
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stockholders;”33 and Muoio for breaching his duty of loyalty “and/or”
good faith because he was not independent of Prosser and “voted to
approve the transaction even though he knew, or at the very least had
strong reasons to believe, that the $10.25 per share merger price was
unfair” given his financial expertise.34 The other four directors, although
“not independent of Prosser,”35 were exonerated because their conduct did
not rise to the level of disloyalty or bad faith.36
3. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation
In 2005, Chancellor Chandler issued his opinion on the merits of In
re Walt Disney Co. Derivate Litigation.37 Disney shareholders brought a
derivative suit against the corporation’s directors in connection with the
hiring and termination of Michael Ovitz as Disney’s president, which
resulted in a severance payout to Ovitz of approximately $140 million for
fifteen months work.38 The Disney board consisted of seventeen directors,
including Chairman and CEO Michael Eisner and compensation
committee members Irwin Russell, Raymond Watson, Sidney Poitier, and
Ignacio “Nacho” Lozano. Eisner was the facilitator of Ovitz’s hiring, and
the compensation committee assumed primary responsibility for the Ovitz
employment agreement.
In a lengthy opinion that criticized the directors’ conduct in many
respects,39 Chancellor Chandler nevertheless found no fiduciary duty
breaches in connection with the Ovitz employment agreement (in this
33

Id. at *39 & n. 184.

34

Id. at *39-40.

35

Id. at *41.

36

Id.:
The conduct of these four directors differs from that of Raynor and
Muoio, in that there is no evidence that any of those four affirmatively
colluded with Prosser to effect the Privatization, or that they otherwise
deliberately engaged in conduct disloyal to the minority stockholders’
interests. Nor have the plaintiffs shown that any of those directors
knew or had reason to believe, that the merger price was unfair.

37

2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113. This case had been bouncing between the Delaware
Chancery and Supreme Courts for several years. For prior opinions in this case, see
[cites].
38

See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L. J. 1, 17 & n. 48 (2005) (noting that “Ovitz
was paid approximately $140 million in stock, cash, and options,” but that this “measure
is approximate due to the problem of valuing the equity and the options. $140 million is
the plaintiff’s measurement of the total cost and may be high”).
39

The specific critiques are too numerous to list, but the gist was that Eisner acted
as an imperial CEO who negotiated with Ovitz in secret, and that the compensation
committee (and to a lesser extent the full board) was comprised of Eisner’s cronies who
simply acceded to his wishes.
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case, the duties of care and good faith were implicated40). Before
analyzing the merits of fiduciary duty claims, Chancellor Chandler took
note of the conflicting answers to the individual/collective question set
forth in Van Gorkom and Emerging Communications:
In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court analyzed the
Trans Union board of directors as a whole in determining
whether the protections of the business judgment rule
applied. More recent cases understand that liability must
be on a director-by-director basis.
In Emerging
Communications, Justice Jacobs wrote (while sitting as a
Vice Chancellor) that the “liability of the directors must be
determined on an individual basis because the nature of
their breach of duty (if any), and whether they are
exculpated from liability for that breach, can vary for each
director.” There is a not insignificant degree of tension
between these two positions, notwithstanding the
procedural differences between the two cases.41
After noting the tension between the prior cases, Chancellor
Chandler analyzed the conduct of the primary actors (Eisner and each of
the compensation committee members) individually. He determined that
although their actions did not meet the ideal in corporate practices, neither
did they fall below well-established fiduciary duty standards. The actions
of the remainder of the board were analyzed only briefly and
collectively.42 The full board was also exonerated.43 When the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed the Chancellor’s decision in June 2006, it did not
reach the substance of the individual/collective question, instead finding
that plaintiffs’ were procedurally barred from alleging the Chancellor’s
use of the individual approach for the primary actors as error.44 The court
40

The traditional duty of loyalty claims had been dropped fairly early in the suit.
See Griffith, supra note 38, at 18-19.
41

2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *154 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

42

The Chancellor’s opinion devotes over thirty pages to scrutinizing the role of
Eisner and the compensation committee members in approving Ovitz’s employment
agreement, id. at *190-224, but only three pages to all of the other directors combined.
Id. at *225-228. This is because the board’s sole action was to approve Ovitz as
president – the terms of his employment were delegated to the compensation committee.
Plaintiffs alleged this delegation as error in their appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court,
which was rejected. 2006 Del. LEXIS 307, at [cite] (“The Chancellor’s ruling – that
executive compensation was to be fixed by the compensation committee – is legally
correct.”).
43

2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *225-228.

44

2006 Del. LEXIS 307, * 64:
To begin with, the argument is precluded by Rule 8 of this Court,
which provides that arguments not fairly presented to the trial court will
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added that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated prejudice from this
approach.45
B. Cases Implicitly Addressing the Individual/Collective Question
Although Van Gorkom, Emerging Communications, and Disney all
explicitly addressed the individual/collective question, standing alone they
do not tell us very much. Emerging Communications supports an
individual focus for duty of loyalty claims, but it is only one case, and
Justice Jacobs gave little reasoning for his individual focus. However,
other case law is clear that consequences flow from even one director’s
disloyalty. For instance, corporate opportunity cases (a subset of the duty
of loyalty) routinely center on allegations that a single director has
usurped a corporate opportunity.46 The consequences of disloyalty begin
with greater judicial scrutiny of the challenged transaction, and potentially
end with the imposition of liability on the disloyal director.47 The relevant
Delaware statutory provision, discussed below, is equally clear that an
individual focus is required in duty of loyalty cases.48 Although the good
faith jurisprudence to this point has been quite confusing and in flux,
Emerging Communications could be read to support an individual focus
when good faith is implicated.49
Van Gorkom and Disney are less clear in their resolution of the
individual/collective question in duty of care cases. In Disney, Chancellor
Chandler cited Van Gorkom as adopting the collective focus, yet the Van
Gorkom court chose the collective approach due to the directors’ request
rather than through any substantive reasoning. Similarly, it is difficult to
know what to make of Disney, where carelessness allegations were
interwoven with allegations of bad faith to propel plaintiffs past an early

not be considered by this Court. The appellants’ “individual vs.
collective” argument goes beyond being not fairly presented. It borders
on being unfairly presented, since the appellants are taking the trial
court to task for adopting the very analytical approach that they
themselves used in presenting their position.
(citation omitted).
45

See id. (“The argument also fails because nowhere do appellants identify how
this supposed error caused them any prejudice”). [Note: need to incorporate any postDisney opinions mentioning the individual/collective question, including Sample v.
Morgan, 2007 WL 177856 (Del. Ch.), into this section.]
46

See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).

47

See id.

48

See infra Part II.C.1.

49

See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing Justice Jacobs’ individual director focus for
breaches of the duties of loyalty “and/or” good faith).
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motion to dismiss.50 The Delaware Supreme Court did not address the
substance of the individual/collective question, while Chancellor Chandler
took somewhat of a hybrid approach, analyzing Eisner and the
compensation committee individually and the remainder of the board
collectively. Looking to cases that have implicitly resolved this issue,
however, supports Van Gorkom’s collective focus in duty of care cases.
Courts generally do not draw distinctions among directors based on
their inside/outside director status or expert/non-expert qualifications
when assessing compliance with the duty of care,51 which points toward a
collective focus. First, even though “inside” and “outside” directors serve
different functions,52 with inside directors being more intimately involved
in managing corporate affairs and outside directors playing more of a
monitoring role,53 courts generally do not hold inside directors to a higher

50

Duty of care claims, standing alone, are subject to dismissal if the corporation
has adopted a 102(b)(7) provision. See infra notes 133-136 and accompanying text. See
also Norman Veasey and Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1441 (2005) (“the Disney litigation – as the
Supreme Court saw it in Brehm v. Eisner in 2000, based on the original and defective set
of pleadings – seemed to be primarily a due care case….On remand, the case, as
repleaded, morphed into a ‘good faith’ case.”).
51

Courts do distinguish between inside and outside/independent directors for other
purposes, however. See infra note 91.
52

This article draws a basic distinction between inside directors, who are also
officers/management of the corporation, and outside directors, who are not. See
O’KELLEY AND THOMPSON, supra note 23, at 136 (inside directors are “generally the
chief executive officer and her principal subordinate officers” while outside directors are
“usually are employed full time as either chief executives or financial officers of other
corporations, or are lawyers, accountants, or investment bankers”). Outside directors
may or may not qualify as “independent” depending on the standard used. See Hillary A.
Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, __ BUS. LAW. __, __ n. 4 (2006) (to
be independent under New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules, “directors must not have
any significant familial or financial ties with the company,” while to be independent
under Delaware law, “a director must not be beholden to her fellow board members and
able to formulate her own decisions on issues free of improper influence”). For criticism
of the more formalistic NYSE definition of independence, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, A
Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L. J. 370
(2002). For an alternative approach to independence, see Note, Beyond “Independent”
Directors: A Functional Approach to Board Independence, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1553
(2006).
53

See Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:
An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 873 (1991):
The justification for relying on outside directors as a monitoring
mechanism is straightforward.
Because such directors are
“independent” – that is, they do not have a personal financial stake in
retaining management – they can act as shareholder surrogates to
assure that the company is run in the long-term best interests of its
owners.
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standard of care. For example, in Norlin v. Rooney, 54 the Second Circuit
stated that “[w]e are not persuaded that a different test applies to
‘independent’ as opposed to ‘inside’ directors under the business judgment
rule.”55 There are exceptions in the case law, however,56 and outside
directors are entitled to more reliance on reports made by corporate
officers, accountants or appraisers in fulfilling their duty of care than are
inside directors.57
Courts have also tended to hold expert and non-expert directors to
the same standard of care. For example, in the 2006 case of Canadian
Commercial Workers Industry Pension Plan v. Alden,58 the Delaware
Chancery Court held that “Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants should be
held to a higher standard of care because they are professionals [an
accountant and a lawyer] is unavailing.”59 Norman Veasey, former Chief
On monitoring vs. managing boards, see MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE
A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1997); Fisch, supra note 3.

OF THE CORPORATION:
54

744 F.2d 255 (2nd Cir. 1984).

55

Id. at 260. See also Donald E. Pease, Outside Directors: Their Importance to
the Corporation and Protection from Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 25, 49 (1987):
In Aronson v. Lewis, the court said that the directors have a duty to
inform themselves of all material information reasonably available
before making a decision and that they must act with requisite care in
the discharge of their duties. There is no hint in Aronson of a
distinction between the responsibility of inside and outside directors;
apparently they are all subject to the same standard.
(citations omitted); In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698
A.2d 959 (1996). It should be noted, however, the Delaware Supreme Court has recently
pronounced that so-called “duty to monitor” cases such as Aronson and Caremark,
widely thought to be due care cases, are really good faith/loyalty cases. See infra Part
III.B.1.b.
56

For a case that is sometimes cited in support of lesser fiduciary duty standards
for outside directors, see Rowen v. Le Mars Mutual Ins. Co. of Iowa, 282 N.W.2d 639,
652 (Iowa 1979) (subjecting outside directors to lesser fiduciary duty standards because
“an outside director does not have the same duty or responsibility that falls upon those
who are in active charge and who dictate day-to-day policy”).
57

See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(e):
A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee
designated by the board of directors, shall, in the performance of such
member's duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the
records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports
or statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation's
officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by
any other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are
within such other person's professional or expert competence and who
has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the
corporation.

58

2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42.

59

Id. at *29, n. 54.
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Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, recently opined that “[i]t would be
a perversity of corporate governance goals, in my view, for the Delaware
courts to announce a general rule that a director with special expertise is
more exposed to liability than other directors solely because of her status
as an expert.”60 Justice Jacobs’ more stringent treatment of financial
expert Mouio in Emerging Communications appears to be an exception to
this general rule,61 although that opinion can be read to call into question
Mouio’s good faith due to his expert status rather than alter his standard of
care.62 (If the latter reading is correct, it also supports an individual focus
in good faith cases.) Whether there should be an expert/non-expert
distinction has been the topic of recent discussion, particularly as it relates
to audit committees.63
If courts wished to account for the differences among directors in
assessing due care compliance, we would expect to them to draw
distinctions based on inside/outside director status and expert/non-expert
qualifications. The fact that courts are not routinely drawing these
distinctions suggests that they deem a collective focus appropriate in duty
of care cases.

60

Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 50, at 1446.

61

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

62

This is how Chief Justice Veasey appears to read Emerging Communications.
In discussing Mouio’s liability, he states:
When purporting to rely on another expert in a transaction where a
director knows that the expert’s opinion is questionable, the director
could be at greater risk of liability than the other directors. This is not
because of the director’s status as an expert. It is simply that a director
with such expertise cannot rely in good faith on another expert’s
particular opinions under section 141(e).
Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 50, at 1446.
63

The SEC has come out against a heightened standard of liability for financial
experts on audit committees. See Exchange Act Release No. 47,235 [2002-2003 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec L. Rep. (CCH) P 86,818, at 86,894 (Jan. 23, 2003) (“Our new rule
provides that whether a person is, or is not, an audit committee financial expert does not
alter his or her duties, obligations or liabilities…under federal or state law.”) For
conflicting views on whether audit committee members should be held to a higher
standard of care, compare Jill E. Fisch and Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal
Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of
Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 572 (2003) (asking “[i]f, as the Commission's safe harbor
suggests, audit committee members do not face increased liability exposure, is it realistic
to expect them to play an active role?”) with Kevin Iurato, Comment: Warning! A
Position on the Audit Committee Could Mean Greater Exposure to Liability: The
Problems with Applying a Heightened Standard of Care to the Corporate Audit
Committee, 30 STETSON L. REV. 977 (2001).
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C. Relevant Statutory Provisions
1. Delaware General Corporation Law § 144
Finally, two important statutory provisions on fiduciary duties add to
our body of existing law addressing the individual/collective question.
The first is Delaware General Corporation Law Section 144, which speaks
to the duty of loyalty and holds that certain transactions are not void solely
because of “1 or more” directors’ self-dealing.64 The mechanisms that can
save a self-dealing transaction from automatic voidability are: (1)
disclosure of the conflict followed by the approval of disinterested
directors; (2) disclosure of the conflict followed by the approval of
shareholders; or (3) a judicial determination that the transaction was fair to
the corporation.65 If the transaction cannot be saved through these
mechanisms, the self-dealing director owes damages in an amount equal to
the “unfairness” of the transaction, a measure usually based on rescission
or restitution.66
Section 144’s use of the language “1 or more” to modify directors
makes clear that even one director’s self-dealing forms the basis for
greater judicial scrutiny of the transaction, and potentially for liability.
Consequently, it supports the case law’s preference for an individual
director focus in duty of loyalty cases.
2. Model Business Corporation Act § 8.30
Although this article focuses on Delaware law, the Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA) has been enacted in some form by a majority of
states and therefore constitutes an important source of corporate law.67

64

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 144(a).

65

See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, 167-70 (1986) (discussing these
mechanisms but noting that disclosure plus either disinterested director approval or
shareholder approval does not mean that a court cannot also inquire into entire fairness).
In the past, interested director transactions were automatically voidable by the
corporation regardless of whether they had been disclosed, approved, or were fair to the
corporation. See Harold Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and
Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 35 (1966).
66

CLARK, supra note 65, at 175 (“For example, when an officer sells property at an
unfair, inflated price to his corporation, he becomes liable for the difference between the
actual price and the fair value of the property.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law
and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1276 (1999) (“Generally speaking, the legal
sanctions for violating the duty of loyalty are inefficiently low. The primary legal
sanctions are rescission and restitution.”). See also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
663 A.2d 1134, 1147-1150 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff’d. 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983).
67

See Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 50, at 1417 (“Although Delaware is
not a Model Act state, it is sometimes helpful to learn from the articulation of the
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After its 1998 revision, the MBCA was clear in its preference for a
collective focus on the directors in duty of care cases.68 MBCA Section
8.30 speaks to the duty of care as a standard of conduct.69 The official
comment to that section reads “[w]hile certain aspects [of a director’s
performance] will involve individual conduct (e.g., preparation for
meetings), these functions are generally performed by the board through
collegial action.”70 Gordon Smith remarks that the revisions “took further
pains to subordinate the concept of care, placing it in a separate provision
whose wording was intended to suggest that care primarily is a concern of
the board as a separate institution, not the individual director.”71 Jeffrey
Bauman, Elliott Weiss, and Alan Palmiter also note the MBCA’s sharp
focus on the whole board:
A significant change in the amended MBCA § 8.30… is the
emphasis on the board as a collective decision-making
body….The
Official
Comment
to
MBCA
§
8.30…emphasizes that in evaluating board actions, it will
be the conduct of the entire board rather than a particular
director that will be most important.72
In sum, while Van Gorkom and Disney do not say much about how
courts view the individual/collective question in duty of care cases, the
case law that implicitly addresses the question suggests a preference for a
collective focus. In addition, although there is no statutory provision

corporate law in the MBCA. The MBCA is followed in varying forms by a majority of
the states….”).
68

For a discussion of the 1998 revisions, see R. Franklin Balotti and Joseph
Hinsey IV, Director Care, Conduct, and Liability: The Model Business Corporation Act
Solution, 56 BUS. LAW. 35 (2000).
69

MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (MBCA) § 8.30(b):
The members of the board of directors or a committee of the board,
when becoming informed in connection with their decision-making
function or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall
discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position
would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.

The standard of liability is found in § 8.31. For the difference between standards
of conduct and standards of liability, see infra notes 173-181 and accompanying text.
70

§ 8.30(b) cmt.

71

D. Gordon Smith, A Proposal to Eliminate Director Standards from the Model
Business Corporation Act, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1201, 1213 (1999).
72

JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIAL AND
PROBLEMS 673 (5th ed. 2003).
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similar to MBCA § 8.30 in Delaware,73 the MBCA provision further
reveals a preference for a collective focus in duty of care cases.
III
ANSWERING THE INDIVIDUAL/COLLECTIVE QUESTION ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE POLICY GROUNDS
The previous Part observed that courts have answered the question
of individual or collective liability for directors differently depending on
the type of fiduciary duty at issue. This Part asks whether this duty-based
approach – which treats loyalty breaches individually and due care
breaches collectively – can be defended on corporate governance policy
grounds. More specifically, it asks whether this duty-based approach will
improve board functioning. Because the courts’ approach strikes the right
balance between a board’s authority and accountability, and because it
furthers the deterrence and compensation goals underlying fiduciary duty
suits, this Part concludes that a duty-based approach is normatively
desirable.
A. Normative Criteria for Promoting a Well-Functioning Board
1. Board’s Authority/Accountability Balance
Drawing on the work of Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow,74
Stephen Bainbridge has stated that the balance between a board’s authority
and its accountability is what “all of corporate law” is intended to
achieve.75 On the one hand, the board has almost complete authority over
corporate affairs pursuant to the laws of Delaware and every other state.76
In theory, shareholders retain some control rights – most notably the right
to elect directors, amend corporate bylaws, and approve certain major
transactions – but even these rights are severely limited in practice.77 The
73

See Smith, supra note 71, at 1227 (“It is worth remembering that Delaware does
not have a statutory provision prescribing the duty of care.”).
74

KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974).

75

Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 84 (2004) (“My analysis is grounded on the core proposition that the
business judgment rule, like all of corporate law, is designed to effect a compromise – on
a case-by-case basis – between two competing values: authority and accountability.
These values refer, respectively, to the need to preserve the board of directors' decisionmaking discretion and the need to hold the board accountable for its decisions.”) (citation
omitted). For an earlier discussion of Arrow’s work, see D. Gordon Smith, Corporate
Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons from Kmart, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037,
1119 (1996).
76

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141.

77

For instance, although shareholders have the right to elect directors, they must
choose from management’s nominees or instigate a proxy fight. Similarly, although
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board’s wide authority is acknowledged to be “essential for organizational
efficiency” given the separation of ownership and control in public
corporations.78 On the other hand, the board must exercise its authority
responsibly, as directors who serve their own interests rather than the
interests of shareholders do not increase shareholder wealth. Fiduciary
duties are one way of holding directors accountable to shareholders,
thereby reducing agency costs.79 Accountability, whether imposed
through fiduciary duty law or some other means, serves as the competing
principle to authority, and “one cannot have more of one without also
having less of the other.”80 The pertinent question, then, is where do we
draw the line between authority and accountability to achieve optimal
balance?81
In fiduciary duty litigation, the answer may seem simple: hold
directors accountable only if they breach their fiduciary duties, otherwise
respect their authority. But the matter is more complicated when the
individual/collective question presents itself – i.e., when some directors
breach and others do not. Employing an individual focus and holding only
the breachers liable does not produce optimal results in all cases. Instead,
the choice between an individual or collective focus should be informed
by the adequacy of the board’s decisionmaking process.82 The goal, after
shareholders have the right to approve certain major transactions, such as the sale of the
corporation, any such action must first be instigated by the board. See Bainbridge, supra
note 2, at 568-573. Given this reality, some corporate law scholars argue in favor of
increased power for shareholders. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005); LUCIAN BEBCHUK AND JESSE FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 201-16 (2004); Robert B. Thompson and D. Gordon
Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate
Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261 (2001).
78

Bainbridge, supra note 75, at 107.

79

Although directors are not technically agents and shareholders are not
technically principals, the agency theory of the firm has “dominated corporate legal
scholarship for at least two decades.” Thompson and Smith, supra note 77, at 268. For
the argument that the corporate law literature has overemphasized the importance of
agency costs, see Robert K. Rasmussen and Douglas G. Baird, The Prime Directive, draft
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=930187.
80

Id. at 103.

81

This question was the subject of an online debate between Gordon Smith and
Stephen Bainbridge in September 2006, although that debate was concerned with
increased shareholder participation in corporate governance rather than fiduciary duty
litigation. See http://www.pointoflaw.com/feature/ (last visited September 23, 2006).
82

Corporate law tends to focus on the board’s decisionmaking process rather than
the substantive decision that results from that process. Consider corporate law’s most
ubiquitous tenet, the business judgment rule. Under the business judgment rule, if a
board deliberates in an informed manner and acts in the best interests of the corporation,
then a negative substantive outcome will not result in director liability. See In re
Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (1996) (“[t]he
business judgment rule is process oriented”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Symposium: The
Director’s Duty of Care in Negotiated Dispositions, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 579, 590
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all, is to promote a well-functioning board that will make wealthenhancing decisions. If a single director’s breach jeopardizes that goal, is
it not appropriate to account for that? Similarly, if a single director’s
breach does not jeopardize that goal, is it not appropriate to take that into
consideration as well?
Accordingly, the authority/accountability line should be drawn
between board processes that are likely to be adequate – i.e., where we
have reasonable confidence that a fiduciary duty breach did not effect the
board’s outcome – and those that are not. If the board’s process is likely
to be adequate, we should respect the board’s authority through judicial
restraint. But if the board’s process is likely to be inadequate, we should
favor director accountability through judicial intervention. It is critical to
draw the line in the proper place. Favoring accountability too often would
diminish the efficiency benefits of centralized decisionmaking. Too much
intrusion into the board’s process and too high an incidence of director
liability can chill director risk-taking and dissuade outside directors from
serving on boards.83 However, favoring authority too often would give
directors little incentive to engage in good decisionmaking.84 Some threat
of intrusion and the imposition of director liability can serve to induce
better fiduciary duty behavior, and also award compensation to aggrieved
shareholders when warranted.85 Striking the right balance between
authority and accountability in fiduciary duty litigation is essential to
ensuring a well-functioning board,86 and the individual/collective question
speaks directly to that balance.
(1997) (“The sharp differentiation between the standards of review of the quality of board
decisions on the one hand, and the decisionmaking process on the other, may be seen as a
special case of a recurrent legal tendency to review procedure much more intensively
than substance.”).
83

This is commonly thought to be the effect of Van Gorkom, and why the
Delaware legislature responded by eviscerating the duty of care in its aftermath. See
Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance,
14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1989). See also Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (2006) (“Regardless of one’s position on the [desirability of
outside director liability]…all would agree that, beyond some level of liability risk,
qualified people may decide not to serve as directors and that those who do serve may
become excessively cautious. Too much fear of liability, therefore, may reduce rather
than enhance the quality of board decisions.”).
84

This assumes that non-legal sanctions alone cannot adequately police director
misbehavior, a claim that some academics would dispute. See supra note 8.
85

See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 6, at 395 (“legal liability represents an essential
mechanism for ensuring directors' fidelity to their fiduciary duties”).
86

See Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in
Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 27 (2003):
In a post-Enron world of corporate governance scandal and calls for
reform, fiduciary duty law presents, as a policy matter, a possible state
law-based approach for attaining greater director accountability. The
wisdom of doing so will depend, in part, on whether the risk of greater

20

Of the two approaches, the individual approach favors accountability
over authority by allowing greater judicial intrusion into the boardroom. It
allows courts to rebut the presumptions of the business judgment rule and
engage in more extensive review of a board’s process, possibly imposing
director liability, based on a fiduciary duty breach by even one director.
Because it shifts authority from boards to judges, the individual approach
should be reserved for cases where a sole director’s fiduciary duty breach
is harmful enough to meaningfully taint the board’s process and shake our
confidence in the resulting outcome. In other words, an individual focus is
appropriate where a sole director’s actions are sufficiently grave to
jeopardize the functioning of the whole board. In practice, the breaching
director is the only director who faces liability.
The collective approach, on the other hand, favors authority over
accountability by deferring to the board’s process. It only allows for
judicial intervention and director liability in cases where a significant
number of directors have breached their fiduciary duties. Because it
allows a single director’s fiduciary breach to go unaccounted for, the
collective approach should be reserved for cases where that breach is not
harmful enough to meaningfully taint the board’s process and shake our
confidence in the resulting outcome. In other words, a collective focus is
appropriate where the board functions adequately despite the wrongdoing
or lapse of an individual director.
Courts could, of course, use the collective approach to impose
liability on the full board for the wrongdoing of even a single director,
thereby enticing outside directors to more carefully monitor inside
directors.87 Daryl Levinson has argued that collective sanctions of this
kind “make functional sense when group members have the capacity to
monitor and control the behavior of some intuitively primary wrongdoer
more efficiently than an external sanctioner.”88 Levinson notes that
financial exposure will induce enhanced discharge of director
responsibilities, to the advantage of shareholders, or dissuade capable
prospective director candidates from service, to the detriment of
shareholders.
87

The use of outside directors as monitors firmly established as corporate
governance policy. In the wake of recent corporate scandals, the perceived importance of
outside directors has received even more attention than in the past. See James D. Cox,
Symposium: Lessons from Enron, How Did Corporate and Securities Law Fail?
Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with
Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2003) (“It is safe to say that
expectations for the independent director have never been higher than they are today.”);
Fisch, supra note 3 (discussing managerial vs. monitoring boards); Sale, supra note 52
(SEC now envisions a heightened role for independent directors as securities monitors).
See also supra note 53 (rationale behind using outside directors as monitors).
88

Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 426 (2003). See
also Note, Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2336
(2005); CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY 162 (2000) (“I suggest that those who
contribute to collective acts on an ongoing basis will fall into the category of intentional
participants so long as they see themselves as part of a collective act, and whether or not
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vicarious liability and joint and several liability are based on the idea of
collective sanctions.89 Although collective sanctions are an interesting
theoretical possibility in fiduciary duty litigation, they have not been
widely used. Courts do not typically impose fiduciary liability on a full
board for an individual director’s breach.
In a recent empirical study, Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, and
Michael Klausner found only three cases in the past 25 years, including
Van Gorkom, where outside directors made out-of-pocket payments for
fiduciary duty breaches.90 This low incidence of outside director liability
is partially because, Van Gorkom notwithstanding, less-culpable outside
directors do tend to shield more-culpable inside directors from liability.91
Under the collective approach, non-breaching directors tend to protect
breaching directors rather than vice versa. Therefore, a collective focus is
not used to impose accountability through collective sanctions, but instead
to reinforce the board’s authority.
2. The Deterrence and Compensation Goals Underlying Fiduciary Duty
Suits
If achieving the proper balance between a board’s authority and its
accountability is the ideal in corporate governance, then it should have the
most to say about our answer to the individual/collective question.
However, fiduciary duty litigation is a particular subset of corporate
they favor the collective goal. If so, they are subject to the inclusive ascription of
collective acts.”).
89

Levinson, supra note 88, at 362-370.

90

See Black et al., supra note 83, at 1055 (empirical study finding that outside
directors of public companies have made personal payments in only thirteen cases in the
last twenty-five years, and only three of these thirteen case involved state law fiduciary
duties). The authors did not count Emerging Communications, which, if outside director
Muoio ended up making an out-of-pocket payment, would make the fourth case.
91

Outside/independent directors provide other legal benefits as well. A board’s
decision not to pursue a derivative action after demand, or a special litigation
committee’s decision to dismiss a suit after demand futility, is more likely to be protected
by the business judgment rule if directors are disinterested and independent. See Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (on demand futility); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (on special litigation committees). Also, “the Delaware courts
have held that the decisions of boards with a majority of outside directors are entitled to
certain beneficial presumptions.” Pease, supra note 55, at 35 (citing Puma v. Marriott,
283 A.2d 693 (1971), and takeover cases from the 1980s); see also Ivanhoe v. Newport
Mining Co., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del. 1987) (“with the independent directors in the
majority, proof that the board acted in good faith and upon reasonable investigation is
materially enhanced”); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate
Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 963 (1996)
(“courts may be more inclined to approve the board’s actions if the board was composed
of a majority of independent outside directors”); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Independent
Directors and Stock Market Prices: The New Corporate Governance Paradigm, draft
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928100.
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governance, and the American Law Institute (ALI) identifies two specific
goals for this litigation that must also be examined. First, fiduciary duty
litigation is intended to deter against fiduciary duty breaches ex ante;
second, it is intended to compensate for the losses those breaches cause ex
post.92 While these goals have been delineated separately from the
authority/accountability balance, the following discussion shows that they
ultimately inform that balance rather than compete with it.
a. Deterrence
The deterrence of director wrongdoing is thought to be a stronger
rationale for allowing fiduciary duty suits than compensation.93 The U.S.
Supreme Court has remarked that even in cases where it “may be
impossible to assign monetary value to the benefit,” fiduciary duty
litigation can “render a substantial service to the corporation and its
shareholders.”94 It may be that fiduciary duty litigation itself is a weak
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ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Introduction, Part VII,
Reporter’s Note 2 (1992) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (“As with other forms of tort
actions, the derivative’s action’s principal goals are deterrence and compensation.”).
Although the ALI Principles discuss fiduciary litigation that takes the form of a
derivative suit, these suits have now taken a backseat to shareholder class actions. See
Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Face of Derivative
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1762 (2004) (in Delaware in 1999 and 2000, 824
fiduciary duty suits were in the form of class actions, while only 137 were derivative
suits). This is probably due to the derivative suit’s demand requirement and the mergers
and acquisitions context in which these suits frequently arise, where shareholders can
claim a direct injury. Id. at 1762. But the difference between derivative suits and class
actions is of little consequence to the discussion at hand – the goals underlying derivative
suits apply more or less equally to class actions. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra, at 13
(deterrence rationale for derivative suits “applies as well to the context of shareholder
litigation”).
93

See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, Reporter’s Note at 16 (“if meritorious
derivative actions seeking to enforce legal rules that protect all shareholders could be
easily terminated simply by showing that they would not yield a positive net recovery,
average agency costs might rise…”); James D. Cox, American Law Institute’s Corporate
Governance Project: Remedies: Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as
Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984):
In two important areas, the proposal to the ALI makes deterrence
paramount over a compensatory objective. First, although defendants
can usually avoid liability by establishing that their misconduct created
a net benefit to the corporation, the proposal disallows such a defense if
the court believes the defense ‘would frustrate an authoritatively
established public policy.’ Second, courts in their review of a dismissal
recommendation of a special litigation committee must find that
‘dismissal of the action would not frustrate any authoritatively
established public policy.’
But see Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S.
703 (1974).
94

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970).
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deterrent compared with market and other non-legal forces acting on
directors.95 The deterrent effect of fiduciary duty suits is certainly reduced
by the availability of indemnification and D&O insurance, which serve to
protect certain breaching directors from making personal payments.96
Nevertheless, the threat of fiduciary liability is thought to play some role
in deterring director wrongdoing, thereby reducing agency costs between
shareholders and directors.97 Consequently, some courts have allowed
these suits to proceed even when damages are unavailable.98
The individual and collective approaches vary in their deterrent
effect. The individual approach aims deterrence at each director on the
board and penalizes even a single director’s transgression. Consequently,
the individual approach provides a harsh form of deterrence. It should
therefore be reserved for cases where it is necessary for every director to
act, or avoid acting, in a particular manner to ensure a reliable
95

See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, Introductory Note at 5 (“the derivative
action is neither the initial nor the primary protection for shareholders against managerial
misconduct. A variety of social and market forces also operate to hold corporate officials
accountable”).
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Indemnification is available provided the directors have acted in good faith and
in the best interests of the corporation. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 145 (limited permissive
indemnification to amounts paid by a director “if such person acted in good faith and in a
manner such person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of
the corporation”). See also Karl E. Strauss, Indemnification in Delaware: Balancing
Policy Goals and Liabilities, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 143 (2004). D&O insurance, which
almost all public corporations have, provides a further backstop against personal liability.
Because there are no limits imposed by corporate or securities laws on the scope of
coverage, see Black et al., supra note 83, at 1085, D&O insurance should be able to fill
any holes left by good faith exclusions in indemnification. Id. at 1094 (“even outside
directors whose oversight failure is so extreme as to meet the good faith standard may
still be covered by D&O insurance to the extent of the policy limit….D&O policies
exclude from coverage conduct that constitutes deliberate fraud or the taking of illegal
profits. These exclusions are narrower than the conscious disregard of duty conception of
good faith”).
97

See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (1985) (fiduciary duties can reduce
agency costs); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 621, 638 (2004) (“liability rules such as fiduciary duties…[are] devices for
minimizing agency costs”).
AND
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See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 NE 2d 910, 912 (NY 1969):
It is true that the complaint before us does not contain any allegation of
damages to the corporation but this never has been considered to be an
essential requirement for a cause of action founded on breach of
fiduciary duty….This is because the function of such an action, unlike
an ordinary tort or contract case, is not merely to compensate the
plaintiffs for wrongs committed by the defendant but…‘to prevent
them, by removing from agents and trustees all inducement to attempt
dealing for their own benefit in matters which they have undertaken for
others, or to which their agency or trust relates.’

(citation omitted).

24

decisionmaking process. Of course, it is always desirable for each
director to comply with her fiduciary duties, but a balance must be
maintained between properly deterring and overdeterring to the point
where directors do not take risks or want to serve on boards.99 Again the
goal of corporate law generally, and of the choice of assessment approach
specifically, is to maintain the balance between a board’s authority and its
accountability. By favoring accountability, the individual approach may
provide optimal deterrence in some cases but not in others.
The collective approach, on the other hand, aims deterrence at the
board as a whole. If courts used this approach as a collective sanction – to
penalize the whole board for the acts of individual directors – it could
serve as a harsh form of deterrence aimed at outside directors who fail to
monitor inside directors. As noted earlier, however, the collective
approach does not operate as a collective sanction.100 Instead, by
requiring multiple breaches for judicial intervention, the collective
approach is a weak form of deterrence that is appropriate where we worry
about overdeterrence, and where we have confidence in the board’s
decisionmaking process if most directors comply with their fiduciary
duties. The collective approach strikes the authority/accountability
balance in favor of a board’s authority, assuming less of a need for
accountability.
b. Compensation
The other goal of fiduciary duty suits – compensation – functions as
a less-important rationale than deterrence if we accept the conventional
wisdom that holding directors to account provides minimal economic
benefits to shareholders, with plaintiff’s attorneys being the primary
economic beneficiaries.101 Whether or not the conventional wisdom is
99

ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, Introductory Note at 8 (the ALI seeks “to steer a
middle course between excessive reliance on litigation remedies and the abolition of any
judicial recourse for the shareholder,” and “is particularly sensitive to the danger of
overdeterrence and the impact of even the potential risk of litigation on the willingness of
outside directors to serve and on their conduct as directors”). See also supra note 83 and
accompanying text.
100

See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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For a critique of the plaintiff’s attorney’s role in shareholder litigation, see
Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO.
L. J. 1733, 1734 n. 5 (1994) (collecting sources). But see Thompson and Thomas, supra
note 92, at 1749-50 (“roughly 30 percent of the derivative suits provide relief to the
corporation or the shareholders, while the others are usually dismissed quickly with little
apparent litigation activity. In cases producing a recovery to shareholders, the amount of
recovery typically exceeds the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded by a significant
margin”); Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder
Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REV. 542 (1980) (plaintiff shareholders
obtained recovery in approximately 75% of cases, but whether recovery exceeded costs
of litigation was not measured). Shareholders prefer class actions to derivative suits as a
means of compensation, as any sums recovered derivatively go back to the corporate
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correct, the choice between an individual and collective focus impacts the
likelihood of compensation. The individual director approach provides the
most robust means of compensation, as even a single director’s fiduciary
duty breach can trigger a recovery. The recovery is not diminished
because it comes from a single director, as breaching directors are jointly
and severally liable for a plaintiff’s entire loss.102 The collective
approach, on the other hand, makes compensation less likely by requiring
a greater number of breaching directors to trigger recovery. As with
deterrence, a court’s choice between the two approaches should seek to
appropriately compensate without overcompensating. To achieve this
balance, courts should select the individual approach and award
compensation in cases where a single director’s breach is likely to be the
proximate cause of a loss, but select the collective approach and deny
compensation in cases where a single director’s breach is unlikely to have
led to the loss.103
B. Application of Normative Criteria to Fiduciary Duty Claims
1. Duty of Loyalty
a. Self-Dealing
Applying these normative criteria to the different types of fiduciary
duty claims that may be brought reveals support for the courts’ answer to
the individual/collective question based on fiduciary duty type. In
choosing between the individual and collective approaches, classic duty of
loyalty claims present the most straightforward analysis. As a general
coffers, with shareholders compensated only indirectly through a pro rata increase in the
value of their shares. See Thompson and Thomas, supra note 92, at 1758.
102

See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (imposing joint and several liability on all
Trans Union directors); In re Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *43 (“In
the fiduciary duty action, defendants…are jointly and severally liable the plaintiff
class….”); Trieweiler v. Sears, 689 NW2d 807, 835 (Neb. 2004) (based on the principle
that co-agents are jointly and severally liable, “it has been held that directors and officers
of a corporation are jointly and severally liable if they jointly participate in a breach of
fiduciary duty”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Block, 924 SW2d 354, 355 (Tenn 1996)
(“While officers and directors’ liability to the corporation has been attributed to various
legal theories, it has been unanimously recognized that officer and director liability to the
corporation for their collective actions is joint and several.”) (citation omitted).
103

Technically, only the board can cause a loss because no single director has the
power to take action on behalf of the corporation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 14C cmt. b (“An individual director…has no power of his own to act on the
corporation’s behalf, but only as one of the body of directors acting as a board.”).
However, the duty-of-loyalty rules essentially circumvent the board’s role in the case of
an undisclosed conflict-of-interest. If a single director has an undisclosed conflict, the
only question is fairness. If a transaction is unfair, then only the single director is liable.
This suggests that the single director is viewed as the proximate cause of the loss in such
cases.
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matter, a director breaches his duty of loyalty when he approves a
corporate action that benefits himself at the shareholders’ expense (socalled “self-dealing” transactions). For purposes of answering the
individual/collective question, there are three things to note about selfdealing. First, it is intentional rather than negligent conduct. Second, it is
typically done by inside directors, who may try to use their management
positions and more intimate knowledge about the corporation to gain a
personal benefit. Third, according to conventional wisdom, at least, these
inside directors are likely to enjoy board capture, meaning that outside
directors are likely to rubberstamp any recommendations the insiders
make.104 When these three things are combined, it is clear that selfdealing has the potential to taint the board’s decisionmaking process in a
meaningful way – toward the self-dealing director’s ends and away from
the shareholders’ ends.105
Therefore, it is appropriate to favor
accountability over authority in these situations to ensure a functional
board. An individual approach allows courts to engage in more extensive
review of the board’s process or the transaction’s substantive merits, and
to impose liability on disloyal directors in unfair transactions.
CEO Prosser’s conduct in Emerging Communications provides a
good illustration of why an individual focus is appropriate in self-dealing
cases.106 Prosser engaged in self-dealing by scrapping a merger and
instead pushing a privatization, a transaction from which he “‘derived an
improper personal benefit’.”107 Because he would reap a personal
financial benefit from the privatization, Prosser had motive to induce the
board to vote his way without adequate consideration of the shareholders’
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See CLARK, supra note 65, at 183 (detailing reasons why other directors might
be beholden to the CEO); Bainbridge, supra note 75, at 105 (“In practice, of course,
many boards of directors are captured by the firm’s senior management and simply
rubberstamp managerial decisions.”); In re: Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 2005
Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *191 (“Eisner stacked his (and I intentionally write ‘his’ as
opposed to ‘the Company’s’) board of directors with friends and other acquaintances
who, though no necessarily beholden to him in a legal sense, were certainly more willing
to accede to his wishes and support him unconditionally”). Post-Sarbanes-Oxley,
however, this tendency to rubberstamp may be lessening. See “Why Corporate
Boardrooms Are in Turmoil,” Wall St. J., September 16, 2006, p. A7 (“Corporate boards,
which once served largely as rubber stamps for powerful CEOs, have become more
independent, more powerful, and under more pressure to dump leaders who perform
poorly.”).
105

See Jennifer M. Johnson and Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the
Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 378 (1987) (“In merger approval cases,
the directors' unavoidable conflict of interest may taint their actions and
recommendations, thus undermining the effective operation of the structural and market
monitors.”); Karl F. Balz, No-Shop Clauses, 28 DEL. J. CORP. 513, 559-61 (2003)
(discussing the harmful taint of disloyalty on the part of target company directors).
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See supra Part II.A.2.
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2004 WL 1305745, at *39.
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interests. Because he was an inside director who enjoyed board capture,108
the board went along with his proposal. The Emerging Communications
board did not function properly because a single director was disloyal.
Deterrence and compensation are also properly aimed at individual
directors in self-dealing cases. Recall that by penalizing even a single
director’s fiduciary duty breach, the individual approach provides a stricter
form of deterrence and a more likely means of compensation than does the
collective approach. Assuming that intentional actors are more deterrable
than negligent ones,109 a stricter form of deterrence is appropriate for selfdealing. Likewise, given that the law favors harsher financial penalties for
intentional actors than for negligent ones,110 a greater likelihood of
damages is appropriate for disloyalty. Further, overdeterrence and
overcompensation are less of a concern for intentional wrongs such as
self-dealing, particularly because a director’s disloyalty does not
automatically result in liability. As an initial matter, it serves only to rebut
the presumptions of the business judgment rule and trigger judicial
scrutiny of a challenged transaction. The law’s saving mechanisms,
particularly entire fairness, will help keep deterrence and compensation in
check when courts apply the individual approach in self-dealing cases.111
If liability is ultimately assessed, typically the penalty will only be
disgorgement of the ill-gotten gains.112
b. Good Faith
The precise nature of good faith has been in flux in the Delaware
courts for some time now. Before the Delaware Supreme Court took up
the issue in Disney and most recently Stone v. Ritter,113 it was unclear
whether good faith was inextricably tied to the duty of loyalty, the duty of
care, or whether it constituted a third, independent fiduciary duty on equal
footing with the other two. Support had been found for each of these
108

Id. (noting that none of the other directors were independent of Prosser).
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See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost and Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A
Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239,
295 (1999) (“Where…the law imposes criminal or civil penalties on intentional
conduct…complete deterrence is the proper goal. An intentional actor, by definition, acts
with more deliberation and therefore should be more deterrable than a negligent actor.”).
But see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, 133-73 (1970) (“Negligent, no
less than intentional, wrongs are fit subjects for deterrence.”); Donald C. Langevoort,
Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 869 (1995) (suggesting that the
egos of corporate managers can cause them to underestimate the risks or the
wrongfulness of their actions, thereby weakening the deterrent value of legal sanctions).
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See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 30-31 (4th ed. 1971)
(greater liability is imposed on the intentional tortfeasor than on the negligent one).
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See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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2006 WL 3169168.
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positions. For example, Sean Griffith cited several “closely reasoned
chancery court opinions [that] treat good faith as an aspect of the duty of
loyalty,” including Emerging Communications.114
Some opinions,
including the Chancery Court’s opinion in Disney, had been read to
suggest a good faith/due care interplay.115 And Hillary Sale, most notably,
argued that recent Delaware decisions laid the groundwork for recognizing
good faith as an independent fiduciary duty.116
In Disney, the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to establish good
faith as an independent fiduciary duty. The court first noted that, despite
the recent scholarly writing on the subject, “the duty to act in good faith is,
up to this point, relatively unchartered.”117 Then it stated that “the
universe of fiduciary misconduct is not limited to either disloyalty in the
classic sense…or gross negligence. A vehicle is needed to address such
violations doctrinally, and that doctrinal vehicle is the duty to act in good
faith.”118 Curiously, however, after discussing a duty of good faith and
what it entailed, the court hedged in a final footnote reading “we do not
reach or otherwise address the issue of whether the fiduciary duty to act in
good faith is a duty that, like the duties of care and loyalty, can serve as an
independent basis for imposing liability upon corporate officers and
directors. That issue is not before us on this appeal.”119
The reason for the court’s hedge became clear in Stone, a decision
issued less than five months after Disney. In Stone, the court surprisingly
114

Griffith, supra note 38, at 5 n. 11 (citing cases). See also Johnson, supra note
86, at 55 (“Delaware courts have branded conduct falling with the second (‘not in good
faith’) exception [to § 102(b)(7)] as implicating loyalty…”).
115

Griffith observed that Chancellor Chandler focused on the board’s process in
approving the Ovitz employment agreement, which is essentially a due care analysis,
under the rubric of good faith. Griffith, supra note 38, at 22-23 (“As in Van Gorkom,
such allegations would typically form the basis of the complaint under the duty of care,
but the court did not pursue this analysis, perhaps because the business judgment rule and
the 102(b)(7) provision would have kept it from getting very far.”). Hillary Sale noted
the good faith/due care interplay in another well-known Delaware case, In re Caremark
International Inc. Derivative Litigation. Sale, supra note 5, at 467 (“Caremark generated
considerable discussion as a duty of care case when issued. It remains an important
contribution to the perceived standards of care, but arguably is also one of the cases
discussing good faith explicitly in the context of corporate decisionmaking.”).
116

See Sale, supra note 5; Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 50, at 1452
(“Professor Hillary Sale…has concluded rather convincingly that good faith is a separate
fiduciary duty”). On the emergence the duty of good faith, see also Eisenberg, supra
note 5; David H. Cook, The Emergence of Delaware’s Good Faith Fiduciary Duty: In re
Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 91 (2004);
Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct: Are
Delaware Courts Ready to Force Corporate Directors To Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney
IV, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 531 (2005).
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2006 Del. LEXIS 307, *90.
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Id.
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Id. at *102 n. 112.
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reversed course and, with scant explanation, held that good faith was not
an independent fiduciary duty, but part of the duty of loyalty.120 Stone
was interesting in another respect, for not only did it put good faith under
the loyalty heading, but it put the famous Caremark “duty to monitor”
case,121 which was widely seen as a subset of the duty of care,122 under the
loyalty heading as well.
While the good faith jurisprudence of late is somewhat strange, good
faith as defined by Disney (and affirmed by Stone) does more closely
resemble the traditional duty of loyalty than the duty of care.123 In Disney,
the Delaware Supreme Court identified at least three types of bad faith
conduct: intentionally acting with a purpose other than that of advancing
the best interests of the corporation, intentionally acting to violate
applicable positive law, and acting with a conscious and intentional
disregard of duties.124 The first two categories of subjective bad faith are
“fiduciary conduct motivated by an actual intent to do harm,”125 to which
the court remarked “such conduct constitutes classic, quintessential bad
faith is a proposition so well accepted in the liturgy that it borders on
axiomatic.”126 The third category, a “conscious and intentional disregard
of duties,” is a somewhat less obvious type of bad faith, and may have the
potential to expand the range of proscribed fiduciary conduct.127
For purposes of the individual/collective question, the most
important thing to note is that bad faith is currently limited to intentional
misconduct.128 Some corporate law scholars would critique Disney and
120

2006 WL 3169168, at *6 (“the obligation to act in good faith does not establish
an independent fiduciary duty” but that the duty of loyalty “encompasses cases where the
fiduciary fails to act in good faith”).
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In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (1996).
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See Sale, supra note 5, at 467 (“Caremark generated considerable discussion as
a duty of due care case when issued” and “remains an important contribution to the
perceived standards of care”).
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In re: Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 2006 Del. LEXIS 307, at __
(rejecting a conflation of the duties of good faith and care).
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Id. at *99-100.
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Id. at *93.
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Id.
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Id. at *100 (“To protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders,
fiduciary conduct…which does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is
qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence, should be proscribed.”).
128

For a post-Disney opinion emphasizing the intentionality requirement in bad
faith, see ATM-KIM Eng. Financial Corp. v. Araneta, 2006 WL 3783520 (Del. Ch.) at
*19 (“imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not
discharging their fiduciary obligations”), and id. at *21 (behavior of two directors who
failed to monitor inside director and majority shareholder’s self-dealing “was not the
product of a lapse in attention or judgment; it was the product of the willingness to serve
the needs of their employer…even when that meant intentionally abandoning the
important obligations they had taken on”).
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Stone as defining bad faith too narrowly, and would extend the definition
to include egregious acts or derelictions of duty that fall short of
intentional misconduct.129 At least as things stand now, however, the main
reason for using an individual director approach in classic disloyalty cases
– the intentional nature of self-dealing – also suggests that the individual
approach should apply in the new subset of good faith cases. Because bad
faith on the part of even one director might inject a harmful bias into the
board’s decisionmaking process, courts should favor accountability over
authority, and the stricter form of deterrence and compensation, in good
faith cases.
2. Duty of Care
Duty of care claims present a more difficult choice between the
individual and collective approaches.130 Legally, acting with due care
means avoiding gross negligence.131 Practically, it means becoming
informed, weighing decisions, and consulting with the appropriate
advisors.132 Despite Delaware’s passage of § 102(b)(7), which allows
corporations to exculpate directors from personal liability for duty of care
breaches,133 due care claims may well survive a motion to dismiss and call
129

See Sale, supra note 5, at 493 (“a breach of good faith need not be intentional
or conscious” but “does require some sort of obvious, deliberate, or egregious failure”);
Elizabeth Nowicki, The Unimportance of Being Earnest: Reflections on Director
Liability
and
Good
Faith,
draft
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921668 (arguing in favor of liability
for actions that are “not in good faith,” even if such actions do not qualify as “bad faith”).
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Although corporate law’s duty of care is commonly described as a fiduciary
duty, it has been observed that the duty is “not distinctively fiduciary.” Deborah DeMott,
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 915 (duty
of care is “not distinctively fiduciary; many persons, by virtue of the law or their own
contractual undertakings, owe duties of car to other persons with whom they have
nonfiduciary relationships”).
131
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, 162
(2005) (“duty of care violations are only actionable if the directors acted with gross
negligence”).
132

See Sale, supra note 5, at 464-65.
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Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7).
incorporation may contain:

Under this provision, a certificate of

A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not
eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the
director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for
acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title;
or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit.
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for a choice between the individual and collective approaches after trial.
Current law on 102(b)(7) exculpation allows for dismissal of plaintiff’s
complaint when only due care violations are raised.134 Therefore, a
complaint that also alleges disloyalty or bad faith should preserve the
plaintiff’s case for trial, given that bad faith or disloyalty can rebut the
protective presumptions of the business judgment rule and void a
102(b)(7) clause.135 In addition, 102(b)(7) clauses do not preclude a
choice between the individual and collective approaches in assessing duty
of care violations for purposes of granting injunctive relief.136
The lack of due care is a wrong of a different nature than disloyalty
because it is not intentional. According to Bainbridge, “loyalty…differ[s]
in kind, not just in degree, from care….there is a compelling economic
justification for insulating allegedly negligent board decisions from
judicial review. Few components of that justification carry over to selfdealing or bad faith. Indeed, the affirmative case for disregarding honest
errors simply does not apply to intentional misconduct.”137 Likewise,
Alison Anderson has remarked that disloyalty may be thought of as more
“unfair” than negligence because it entails a “more deliberate form of self-

Most states have passed legislation similar to § 102(b)(7). See Romano, supra
note 83, at 30-32 (by 1987, thirty states had passed legislation allowing shareholders to
opt into similar protections for directors); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: CASES & MATERIALS
783 (7th ed. 2001) (by 1999, forty-three states has passed such legislation). Virtually all
large U.S. corporations have opted in favor of these protections. See Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477 app. a (1999)
(finding that in a survey of 100 large U.S. corporations, only 7 did not opt for this
protection). But see Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1267-68 (contending that § 102(b)(7) and
similar provisions have important exceptions).
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See Sale, supra note 5, at 467 & n. 62 (citing cases).
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Under § 102(b)(7), a certificate of incorporation may not limit or eliminate a
director’s personal liability for “any breach of the director's duty of loyalty…acts or
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law…or…for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit”). See also Veasey and Di Guglielmo, supra note 50, at 1441-42 (“if
directors ‘consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities,’ they have not
acted in good faith and their conduct will not be protected by the business judgment rule
or by section 102(b)(7)”).
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See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (duty of care is not
completely eliminated because a court may still grant injunctive relief if directors acted
with gross negligence); E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors With A
Three-Legged Stool Of Limited Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW.
399, 403 (1987) (duty of care “will continue to be vitally important in injunction and
rescission cases and may well be relevant in elections, proxy contests, resignations, and
removal contexts.”).
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STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 306 (2002).
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preference.”138 The Delaware Supreme Court also made this distinction
clear in Disney, explaining that:
Basic to the common law of torts is the distinction between
conduct that is negligent (or grossly negligent) and conduct
that is intentional. And in the narrower area of corporation
law, our jurisprudence has recognized the distinction
between the fiduciary duties to act with due care, with
loyalty, and in good faith, as well as the consequences that
flow from that distinction.139
Whether a director’s wrongdoing is intentional or unintentional has
important ramifications for the board’s decisionmaking process. There is
a more harmful and pervasive quality to a director’s intentional
wrongdoing than to her carelessness. Directors acting intentionally have
motive to subvert the board’s process to win approval of a transaction that
imbues benefits to themselves, in cases of disloyalty, or allow their fellow
directors to subvert the process, in some cases of bad faith.140 Directors
acting negligently, on the other hand, are less likely to even participate in
the deliberation process given their lack of information about the matters
under discussion.141 By analogy, it is almost as though the negligent
director was absent from the board meeting. Yet majority rule permits
boards to make decisions and take action without the participation or vote
138

Alison Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 758 n. 59 (1978); see also Johnson, supra note 86, at
60 n. 191 (“The element of deliberateness may, as the vice chancellor [Leo Strine]
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for purposes of sanctioning inappropriate conduct.”).
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2006 Del. LEXIS 307, at *99 n. 109. Recognition that intentional wrongdoing
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provisions of U.S. securities law. See Sale, supra note 5, at 489 (“Scienter is a key
element of claims pursuant to section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Act and the
accompanying Rule 10b-5 (’10b-5 claims’).”) (citations omitted).
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For instance, in Emerging Communications the court acknowledged that
attorney/director Raynor may not technically have been disloyal, in the classic selfdealing sense, because he did not directly profit from the privatization transaction, but his
complete financial reliance on CEO Prosser – who did directly profit – indicated bad
faith. 2004 WL 13057445, at *39 and nn.183-84. Similarly, although financial
expert/director Muoio was not technically disloyal, neither was he independent of
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Joseph Bonito, a professor of communications who studies participation in
small groups, makes this observation. See Joseph A. Bonito, An Information-Processing
Approach to Participation in Small Groups, 28 COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 275, 279
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of all directors.142 Given majority rule, and assuming that a grossly
negligent director does little more harm in a meeting through her
carelessness than an absentee director does through her absence, the
board’s process is less affected by a single director acting negligently than
one acting intentionally.
Another important difference in the due care setting is the status of
the director likely to engage in the misconduct. Inside directors are more
likely to have conflicts of interest because they serve the corporation fulltime to exclusion of other professional pursuits.143 On the other hand, they
are less likely to be uninformed or otherwise careless given their more
intimate knowledge of corporate affairs.144 Outside directors present the
flip side of the coin. They are less likely to have conflicts of interest, but
are more likely to be careless given that they devote less attention to the
corporation.145 Despite recent efforts to make outside directors more
effective monitors, inside directors continue to enjoy informational and
other advantages.146 For these reasons, outside directors commonly defer
to inside directors during deliberations.147 Given that inside directors
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Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(b) (“The vote of the majority of the directors
present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of the board of directors
unless the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws shall require a vote of a greater
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See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?,
in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 170, 179 (1993) (inside directors are more likely
to satisfy their duty of care because they own more corporate stock).
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See Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability: A Proposal for Legislative
Reform, 66 TEX. L. REV. 411, 426 (1987) (“outside directors, who are typically without
conflicts of interest, must satisfy only a duty of care”).
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See Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three Theories of Corporate
Boards of Directors, 22 J. CORP. L. 1, 4-5 (1996):
One factor that substantially impedes the conflicts monitoring role of
the board is the informational dependence of the board on management.
Managers have expertise and knowledge of corporate affairs and
opportunities available to the corporation. They control meeting dates
and the board's agenda, or the identification of matters to be deliberated
on by the board. Managers also have access to various lines of
communication which permit them to bring the information they
choose to the board's attention.
(citation omitted).
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See Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical
Assessment, 43 WM & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1699-1700 (2002) (“by virtue of his or her
dominant position within the firm, and position as Chairman of the Board, the CEO can
influence, if not control outright, the selection of inside and outside directors. Further,
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direct the board’s deliberations, their fiduciary duty breaches merit greater
attention.148
If due care breaches are less severe in nature because they involve
silent ignorance on the part of less influential outside directors, as opposed
to active subversion by more influential inside directors, then we should
have confidence in a board’s decisionmaking process if most, even if not
all, directors fulfilled their duty of care. Accordingly, it would allow too
much judicial intrusion into the board’s process if consequences were to
flow from a single director’s carelessness, and therefore courts should
select the collective approach to assess duty of care claims. In terms of
our other normative criteria, aiming deterrence and compensation at
individual directors in the due care setting would not matter given §
102(b)(7).149 Because the available remedy for most due care breaches is
now limited to injunctive relief,150 the fear of personal liability should not
deter directors from acting carelessly. Section 102(b)(7) also makes
compensation for due care breaches much less likely.
Although the discussion thus far has been limited to how the
individual
and
collective
approaches
strike
the
board’s
authority/accountability balance and further the deterrence and
compensation goals underlying fiduciary duty suits, it is also important to
consider additional negative effects on the board’s functioning that could
result from using the individual approach in the due care setting. The
consensus-driven decisionmaking process that now exists151 could turn
into a process where directors are pitted against each other (e.g., one
director claiming that other directors withheld relevant information) to
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Recognizing a higher standard of care for officers would be one way to account
for this problem. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson and David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate
Officers are Fiduciaries, 46 WM & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1642 (2005) (“[t]here are fewer
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directors”) (citation omitted); Wade, supra note 6, at 770:
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unavoidably higher than the amount of care owed by a company's
outside directors, who have far less contact and involvement with the
company.
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avoid culpability.152 Board minutes might become detailed to the point of
showing the role that each director played in deliberations, focusing the
directors’ attention on personal perseverance rather than the business of
the corporation.153 In cases that go to trial, directors facing individual
treatment might request separate counsel due to their individual exposure.
This could add to the cost of corporate reimbursement for directors’
attorney’s fees, and could make trials unruly given an average board size
of seven to nine directors.154 An individual focus could also require courts
to itemize and account for individual differences among directors
(including a director’s insider/outsider status and expert/non-expert
qualifications155) to assess due care compliance. As a result, both board
and judicial efficiency would suffer if an individual approach was applied
in duty of care cases. Finally, it is unclear whether an individual approach
would be viable for assessing due care breaches, as it might be difficult to
establish that the careless director was the proximate cause of any harm.
All of this is not to suggest that we should be unconcerned with a
single director’s carelessness, or that we should excuse outside directors
who do not monitor.156 The possibility exists that one negligent director,
had she been sufficiently informed, could have swayed the board’s vote
toward an advisable course of action. This hypothetical scenario unfolds
in classic movie 12 Angry Men,157 albeit in the jury room rather than the
boardroom. In that movie, Henry Fonda is the only juror who believes –
correctly it turns out – that a criminal defendant is not guilty. He ends up
convincing the other jurors, and the jury makes the right decision to
acquit. There is anecdotal evidence that even one director can have the
same type of effect in a boardroom.158 While this may be a tempting
152

Critics of the move toward greater director independence note the advantages of
a collegial board. [cites]
153
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reason to favor an individual approach in the due care setting, on balance
this approach would do more harm than good by penalizing isolated cases
of negligence even if the board as a whole functioned adequately.
A final question must be asked before discussing what a dutyspecific answer to the individual/collective question can tell us about
fiduciary duties more generally. That is, how is a preference for the
collective approach in duty of care cases affected, if at all, by delegation to
a board committee?159 Specifically, to what extent should the full board,
which later approves the committee’s recommendation, be allowed to rely
on the due care exercised by the committee, as opposed to its own due
care? On the one hand, corporate law allows boards to establish and
delegate to committees,160 and the board’s decision to delegate is protected
by the business judgment rule.161 On the other hand, Bainbridge has
identified social science literature that touts the desirability of group
decisionmaking, suggesting that we should be hesitant to allow too much
delegation if a committee’s membership is too small to preserve these
benefits.162 On balance, because committees are likely to have greater
knowledge and expertise of matters within their purview, and because they
are an accepted part of the corporate governance mechanism, it may be
advisable to allow a properly functioning committee to exercise care on
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See Rakesh Khurana and Katharina Pick, The Social Nature of Boards, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (2005) (noting that “[o]bservers say that even a lone
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acquisition).
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Board Committee Structure, 41 J. L. & ECON. 275, 277-78 (1998).
160

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(c); MBCA § 8.25.
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See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 943 (Del. 1985):

An informed decision to delegate a task is as much an exercise of
business judgment as any other. The realities of modern corporate life
are such that directors cannot be expected to manage the day-to-day
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Del.C. § 141(a) that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation
are managed “by or under the direction” of its board. In setting its
agenda as to the matters in which it will be directly involved, and those
it will delegate, a board's decisions in those areas are entitled to equal
consideration as exercises of business judgment.
(citation omitted).
162

See Bainbridge, supra note 154, at 12-19. Cf. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The
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behalf of the full board.163 On the other hand, the decision might depend
on the size of the committee and perhaps also the gravity of the matter
under review.164
IV
BROADER OBSERVATIONS ABOUT FIDUCIARY DUTIES
If courts are oscillating between an individual and collective focus
on directors depending on the type of fiduciary duty at issue, and if this
distinction is desirable on corporate governance policy grounds, how does
this inform the broader fiduciary duty literature? In particular, what does
the courts’ answer to the individual/collective question tell us about the
role of fiduciary duties as a corporate governance mechanism?
The courts’ focus on individual directors in loyalty cases, contrasted
with their focus on the board as a whole in due care cases, permits several
important observations about fiduciary duties. First, it reveals that the
divide between the traditional duties of care and loyalty is even wider than
presently acknowledged. Recovery for duty of care breaches is highly
unlikely due to the protective provisions of the business judgment rule and
the widespread adoption of § 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses.165 Indeed, by
finding no due care violations even in a case like Disney that involved
highly lax director behavior, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed Van
Gorkom’s status as an outlier in corporate law. If a collective approach to
assessing liability requires several grossly negligent directors, rather than
just one, it makes the possibility of recovery all the more remote. On the
other hand, plaintiffs are generally more successful in classic duty of
loyalty claims,166 and the stricter individual director approach further tips
the scales in plaintiffs’ favor. Consequently, this contextualized choice of
assessment approach reveals a further splintering between the duties of
care and loyalty, with courts significantly more likely to impose liability
163

On the benefits of committees, see Anup Agrawal & Shiba Chadha, Corporate
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for disloyalty while leaving problems of carelessness to market,
reputational, and social sanctions.167
Second, this article began by noting that fiduciary duty law currently
serves as a weak mechanism for policing directors, and that several
corporate law scholars have argued in favor of more robust fiduciary law
in the wake of recent corporate scandals.168 If due care liability will not be
revived – and Disney suggests that it will not be – another hope for
achieving this result was a more explicit duty to act in good faith that
could expand or supplement the traditional duties.169 Although the
Delaware Supreme Court has now been more explicit about a requirement
to act in good faith, bad faith has been narrowly defined to include only
intentional misconduct.170 Thus while good faith might somewhat expand
the grasp of fiduciary law, all unintentional misconduct still appears to be
out of reach. By putting good faith on the loyalty side of the dividing line,
the Court reaffirmed that fiduciary law is meant to penalize only the most
egregious offenders through legal sanctions. Judicial use of an individual
approach in these “extreme” cases, compared to a collective approach in
all other cases, further assures this separation. Importantly, it also reveals
a judicial deemphasis on fiduciary liability as a corporate governance
mechanism.
Finally, if courts are dividing the world of fiduciary liability into
intentional and unintentional cases, using an individual or collective focus
as their tool, why are they not more explicit about this? Each fiduciary
duty suit that goes to trial requires a judicial choice between the individual
and collective approaches, either explicitly or implicitly. But recall that
only three major cases – Van Gorkom, Emerging Communications, and
Disney – explicitly speak to this question, and then only superficially.171
When implicit cases are considered, loyalty’s preference for the individual
approach is easier to see than due care’s preference for the collective
approach.172
The question becomes, have courts overlooked the
importance of the individual/collective choice in duty of care cases, or is
there a reason for only an implicit preference?
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The answer might be found in an important discussion distinguishing
corporate law’s “standards of conduct” from its “standards of liability.”173
Melvin Eisenberg and Gordon Smith have observed that standards of
conduct tell directors how to behave, while standards of liability tell
judges when to impose liability for director misbehavior.174 There can be
a significant distance between standards of conduct and standards of
liability, as illustrated by the duty of care.175 The standard of conduct tells
directors to act with “due care,” or “with the care that an ordinarily
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position
and under similar circumstances.”176 But the standard of liability tells
judges to assess liability (or grant injunctive relief) only when the
directors’ actions are irrational – i.e., not a valid exercise of business
judgment.177 A bifurcated structure thus encourages best practices, but
only penalizes unacceptable practices.178 It aspires for a board that
functions perfectly, penalizes a board that functions inadequately, and
tolerates a board that falls somewhere in between.
This bifurcated structure fails to work, however, when directors
“hear” what is meant to be heard by judges – i.e., standards of liability
instead of standards of conduct. Directors who hear laxer standards of
liability may be less likely to strive for higher standards of conduct. To
maintain bifurcation, at least to the extent possible in the real world,
standards of conduct should be made clear, while standards of liability
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should be obfuscated.179 Accordingly, an explicit adoption of the
collective approach in the due care context would run the risk of being
heard by directors, thereby telling them of an important barrier to liability.
For this reason, Smith rightly critiques the MBCA’s explicit adoption of
the collective approach, noting that “[b]y shifting the focus from the
individual director to the board as a collegial body, the MBCA dampens
the force of its command.”180 Delaware courts, on the other hand,
presciently maintain “vagueness in enunciating the decision rule”181 by
only implicitly adopting the collective approach.
V
CONCLUSION
Fiduciary duties are often litigated, and are a favorite topic of
discussion among corporate law scholars. This makes it rather surprising
that an important question within fiduciary law – whether director liability
should be assessed individually or collectively – has been virtually
ignored. This article tackles the individual/collective question and sets
forth a systematic way of approaching it. It favors a duty-specific answer
to this question on both descriptive and normative grounds.
While this article has provided a general framework for answering
the individual/collective question, it has also left some specific questions
unanswered. For instance, most of the judicial opinions that were
discussed in the article were issued after a full trial on the merits. But
many fiduciary duty cases do not make it this far, which leaves the
question of whether the individual/collective problem presents itself, and
in the same way, during the earlier stages of litigation?182 Also, many
factual scenarios resist tidy classification as straight “loyalty” or “due
care” cases, which complicates matters. For example, what would the
individual/collective analysis look like when a board has adopted
questionable takeover defenses against an acquisition, where the
179
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“enhanced scrutiny” standard requires courts to review the transaction
more carefully than due care claims but more deferentially than loyalty
claims?183
Finally, although this article works within the confines of fiduciary
duty suits, the individual/collective question may also be important in
other areas of corporate law.184 According to the Wall Street Journal, the
individual/collective question might have ramifications for D&O
insurance coverage in stock option backdating claims:
In the realm of directors and officers insurance, lawyers are
examining whether an insurer can argue that misconduct by
a single director or executive in granting or dating stock
options can justify refusing to honor coverage for all of the
other directors and officers who were involved in making
the grant even if they didn’t participate in the
misconduct.185
The individual/collective question is an important one, in fiduciary
duty suits and beyond. So far, courts have been answering this question
correctly, even if their rationale has been less than forthcoming.
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